PETER VOLKMAR

In my job market paper, I derive theoretical bounds on OPEC's ability to collude with and without cooperation from Russia. My model finds that OPEC collusion without Russia was both possible and profitable prior to the shale revolution, but subsequent changes to price responsiveness and OPEC membership meant that by 2017 no collusion was possible without Russian assistance.  Furthermore, the model proves the rationality of countries' decision to cheat on production quotas in 2007 and 2017 and counterfactual analysis demonstrates how a sanctions-free Iran could preclude Russian cooperation with the cartel. See paper and presentation.

Using monthly data from 2006 to 2016, I estimate a structural system of quasi-linear equations modeling OPEC's supply decision as a function of their costs, global demand and fringe supply. By allowing the slope of fringe supply to change with increased efficiency of tight oil production, I capture the diminished residual demand OPEC faces.

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 A non-linear 3SLS estimation method yields R-squared values above .99 for OPEC and fringe supply quantities and above .96 for price, suggesting OPEC has continued to act as a strategic oligopoly throughout the tight oil revolution but with vanishingly diminishing ability to exert market power. See paper.

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Energy poverty indexing is only as helpful as it is instructive. Frontier analysis provides efficiency ratings that highlights the inputs not being fully utilized. Charts on the linked website demonstrate a comparison of 60 countries' existing infrastructure relative to their electrication rates. 

The Data Envelopment Analysis employed allows comparison between an inefficient country and its group of economic peers. Additionally, it shows how far from the frontier an under performing country is in each type of input. See website and presentation.